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“The very expression "law and" paradoxically signifies both law's welcoming of other 
disciplines and its continued separation from them” (Balkin, 1996 at 950). 
Introduction. 
John Witte has recently surveyed the field of law and religion within the United States (Witte, 
2012). His “interim report” makes essential reading for anyone interested in scholarship from 
this globally significant set of jurisdictions.  My focus in this chapter is partly on 
contemporary European scholarship, albeit only that part available in English, but also more 
specifically on the contribution that legal scholarship can make to interdisciplinary work on 
the interaction of law and religion. I begin by discussing what sort of discipline law is, and 
how it can interact with other disciplines. I then attempt to consider the contours of legal 
scholarship as they may appear to an outsider, seeking to bring out the key characteristics 
which need to be considered when placing a piece of legal scholarship on law and religion in 
its disciplinary context. I conclude by a brief consideration on what to expect from a legal 
scholar during interdisciplinary dialogue on law and religion. 
What sort of discipline is law? 
Posner argued, in a provocatively titled article, for “[t]he decline of law as an autonomous 
discipline, 1962-1987” (Posner, 1987; see also Posner, 1988). Schlag expressed the same 
scepticism by a lively comparison of the discipline to law to that of phrenology (Schlag, 
1997). One may be sceptical about the autonomy of legal scholarship without thereby 
invalidating the existence of a community of legal scholars (van Zandt, 2003), or necessarily 
concluding that there is nothing distinctive about the work of such scholars (Bix, 2003). 
Nonetheless, the standing of law as a distinctive discipline is not uncontested. That said, I 
follow Vick in seeing a core to the academic study of law which “broadly corresponds with a 
doctrinal approach involving the use of particular interpretative tools and critical techniques 
in order to systematise and evaluate legal rules and generate recommendations as to what 
legal rules should be” (Vick, 2004 at 165).  Using the United States terminology, this will be 
termed Langdellian, after the influential Dean of Harvard Law School, although scholars 
within this tradition frequently do not identify themselves explicitly (Posner, 1988). 
Within this tradition, especially in the common law, Anglophone, world, the legal scholar 
begins with the study of authoritative (typically public domain) legal texts, and then moves 
from knowledge of those texts to apply “the power of logical discrimination and 
argumentation that came from close and critical study of them” (Posner, 1987 at 763). The 
latter is crucial to understanding even that Langdellian scholarship which focuses on 
authoritative texts very closely. Such scholars rarely simply aim to summarise the current 
state of play in the authoritative sources. Rather “the Langdellian scholar [aims] to discover 
and articulate high-level principles, to deduce more specific legal rules, and to criticize 
judicial decisions that had failed to follow this abstract doctrine” (Feldman, 2004 at 476-7). 
With tremendous variations depending upon the legal system under consideration, personal 
style, and intellectual commitments, this type of scholarly work in law remains very common 
(see for instance Rivers, 2010).  
Any departure from pure positivism – that is to say, treating law as authoritatively contained 
within legal sources so that law is what the legal sources say it is – raises the question of 
where Langdellians derive these principles from.  
“Like Jonah - or perhaps more accurately Geppetto - we are inside the legal beast. We 
are both its slaves and its masters, having learned the professional techniques to tickle 
its soft belly from within to make it move in the directions we select. But ironically, 
we remain masters only so long as we also remain slaves. When we are disgorged and 
adrift - both free and naked of the manipulative and commanding power of our 
professional identity - we begin to see and sense the shape, power, and position of the 
legal whale and its course in the greater sea of society.” (Kandel, 1993 at 9-10). 
 
Kandel’s powerful metaphor would suggest that legal scholars must either be within the belly 
of the beast – Langdellians of a particularly pure type – or expelled from it entirely. In 
practice, our relationship with the beast is more likely to fall on a spectrum. At one end of the 
spectrum, our discovery of unstated legal rules, and critique of established ones, is derived 
entirely from legal sources analysed using legal techniques. Samuel sees this as being the 
clear centre of gravity for legal scholarship in the civil law world, more so even than in the 
common-law world (Samuel, 2009).  Further along the spectrum, our discovery draws upon 
insights – fishes - from the broader sea of human knowledge which have joined us in the 
belly of the whale. These insights may, alarmingly, be gained “without recourse to the 
appropriate material available from elsewhere in the academy“(Bradney, 1998 at 71), but are 
increasingly likely to be derived from other academic disciplines. Many of these are 
colonising disciplines which have succeeded in becoming part of the mainstream of legal 
scholarship without thereby changing what it is to be part of the discipline of law (Balkin, 
1996). For our field, much important colonisation has taken place by sociology, but also 
anthropology, history, and theology. Only when we seek to fish for ourselves do we leave the 
belly of the whale; and not all scholars leave the whale to become “disgorged and adrift”. For 
law and religion in particular, three important movements are based on the partial 
colonisation of law by other disciplines. 
Firstly, socio-legal studies. There is perhaps an over-emphasis on the methodological 
approaches of socio-legal studies as providing a distinctive identity. Certainly much socio-
legal work draws on qualitative and quantitative methodologies drawn from the social 
sciences (for a wide-ranging review, see Banaker and Travers, 2005). Socio-legal studies is 
more than simply a tool-kit for data collection and data analysis however. The intellectual 
centre of socio-legal studies is the consideration of law in the context of broader social and 
political theories.  
Secondly, critical legal studies. This broad movement shares a “concern with the politics of 
law, with the stress on law as significant precisely because it is not immunised from the realm 
of politics and thus has definite effects and consequences for the multitudes of arguments, 
battles and struggles which produce the human condition” (Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1997 at 1). 
This starting point frequently leads scholars in this movement to be sceptical of the resolution 
of legal disputes as a technical parsing of legal materials, of the reinforcing of dominance and 
subordination by legal structures, and of the fundamental assumptions of law as to the human 
condition (see further Ward, 2004). Within this however, there is a tremendous diversity. To 
quote from the principal legal journal in the field, Law and Critique, critical legal studies can 
include “a variety of schools of thought, such as postmodernism; feminism; queer theory; 
critical race theory; literary approaches to law; psychoanalysis; law and the humanities; law 
and aesthetics and post-colonialism” (Law and Critique, 2013 at 1).  
Thirdly, legal history. To a very limited extent, law always involves a historical aspect. The 
most traditional of Langdellians when citing a source which has represented the law since, 
say, the 1850s, will have some regard to the context of the law when it was formulated, and 
to events since. Legal history, whether conducted by historians, lawyers, or both, emphasises 
the historical over the contemporary, and does not simply use the historical to frame the 
contemporary (see Tomlins and Comaroff, 2011). A recent call for papers catches the range 
of interests this can engage: ““New Worlds of Faith” will explore the ways that religion and 
law have functioned in the Americas, from colonial periods through 2000. Although we do 
not intend to limit proposals by such examples, we would be interested in papers on 
witchcraft prosecutions, citizenship and religious identity, protections (or not) for religious 
speech and worship, legal repression of indigenous faiths, and so on” (PennLaw, 2013). 
What are the contours of the scholarship in law and religion? 
In approaching law and religion scholarship, it is worth being aware of a number of ways of 
categorising the literature. The importance of these categories is not necessarily patent to 
those encountering the sources from outside the discipline of law. They provide, however, a 
useful taxonomy to consider when evaluating the reach and limitations of a particular writing 
(rather than, say, defining the properties of the genre, as in von Benda-Beckmann, 2008). In 
considering a piece of legal scholarship, it is important to be attentive to its sphere of 
operation, its orientation, and its relationship to the central concerns of law and religion 
viewed from a legal perspective.  
Sphere of operation. 
Law, perhaps more obviously than some other fields of human knowledge, has specific 
spheres. It may make some sense to speak of “German physics” and “French physics” in 
relation to the national characteristics of the academy, but to most scholars rather less so in 
relation to that which is studied itself. There is much less consensus that the laws of physics 
change across that national boundary than that the laws of the land do. So a key feature in 
legal literature on law and religion is the sphere of operation which it addresses. 
A common, and fruitful, focus is upon the national sphere. Here, the focus of the work is 
upon the situation with a particular legal system, or group of legal systems which coexist 
within a national sphere (e.g. Robbers, 2013, now in its second edition). The modes of data 
collection, data analysis and argumentation in relation to the law seek to be compatible with, 
or knowingly challenge, the established modes within that sphere. Because it can appear self-
evident to writers on national law publishing within a national legal press, or within a 
scholarly journal explicitly or implicitly based in the jurisdiction, there may be no 
acknowledgement that the work is nationally bound. There is, however, nothing inconsistent 
with two articles purporting to deal with the law on financing of religious organisations, for 
instance, sharing neither sources nor method when dealing with, say, English law and 
Spanish law. The globalisation, and for Europeans in particular, regionalisation of law 
however means that discussions of the national sphere may intrinsically require discussion of 
regional and international law. A recent example is Daly’s  Religion, Law and the Irish State, 
which while drawing on a range of sources, is centrally concerned with the constitutional 
framework governing church/state relations in Ireland (Daly, 2012). 
An emerging focus is upon the regional sphere. We see this particularly clearly in relation to 
the European Union and the Council of Europe, where a distinct body of regional law, 
including regional law bearing on law and religion, has emerged. In contrast to, say, a 
comparative study of Arab states (e.g. Welchman, 2007), this is not simply the law of states 
within the region, nor is it simply international law – rather it is a distinct sphere, with 
complex relationships with the national spheres of the states within the regionalisation 
project. Doe’s Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction, for instance 
includes not only an ambitious comparative introduction to a range of national approaches by 
European states, but also to the emergent European Union law on religion (Doe, 2011), while 
Zucca develops a model of secularism within the spheres of both the European Union and the 
Council of Europe (Zucca, 2012). 
Another possible sphere of operation is that of international law. Traditionally, this refers to 
the body of law which primarily binds states in their relations with one another. From the 
twentieth century on, however, it has increasingly become a legal order which also seeks to 
control the actions of states in relation to individuals within their territories and, even more 
radically, the actions of individuals in relation to other individuals, as we can see for instance 
in the work of the International Criminal Court. Studies have considered both global 
international law, and regional instruments (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Evans, 2008).  
Within our field, however, there are another set of spheres to be considered, that of the law of 
religious communities themselves. At the margins, there are interesting discussions to be had 
as to whether a religious community which lacks coercive mechanisms for enforcing findings 
can be said to have law, and whether communities which reject the idea of an internal law for 
themselves may nonetheless, through their development of norms and expectations as to 
belief and behaviour, be said to have one (see for instance Bradney and Cownie, 2009). 
Nonetheless, there are clearly religious communities which act as if they have laws of their 
own. In the past these laws were sometimes referred to without regard to the community’s 
traditions as “ecclesiastical law”, but Sandberg’s distinction between religion law and 
religious law, with the law of a religious community being the latter, provides us with a better 
nomenclature (Sandberg, 2011a). Within this sphere of operation we might find for instance 
studies of Church of England ecclesiastical law, Roman Catholic canon law, or Shariah law 
(cf. the separate descriptions of Doe and Ombres  of canon law as “a discipline” in Ombres, 
2012; Doe, 2013). As with the  national spheres, the discussions here will draw upon, or 
contest, the sources and methodology developed within the sphere; and, as with the national 
spheres, different findings as to the law within different spheres are not incompatible. A 
discussion of the marital status of clergy may well, for instance, come to different 
conclusions depending upon whether the sphere being discussed is Church of England 
ecclesiastical law or Roman Catholic canon law. Examples of this sort of religious law work 
can be found in the work of John Witte, who combines the expertise in law and religion in the 
US context alluded to in my introduction with equal expertise in the law and legal thinking of 
major Protestant communities (for instance Witte, 2002; Witte, 2008). 
Finally, and perhaps most contentiously from a Langdellian perspective, there are the works 
of scholarship which do not locate themselves within any of these spheres at all, and which 
may be broadly categorised as legal theory. It should be stressed that this is very different 
from scholarship which combines one or more spheres. In a practical sense, as noted above, 
scholars wishing to engage with, for instance, some areas of UK law, will need to engage 
with European Union and ECHR law in order to properly understand UK law. Thus, they 
combine the national, regional and international spheres (e.g Sandberg and Doe, 2007). 
Similarly, there is a very strong tradition of comparative law in law and religion, where 
scholars work in two or more spheres simultaneously to develop their thinking and arguments 
(see for instance Hafner, Kroissenbrunner and Potz, 2010).  This music of the spheres is 
tremendously varied, and of growing importance in the literature. An important example of 
work combining multiple national spheres, now in its second edition, is Ahdar and Leigh’s 
study of religious freedom in liberal states, which studies the US, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia, and the EU (Ahdar and Leigh, 2013). There is also a large, and growing, body of 
work which seeks to compare different spheres, particularly a religious law sphere and the 
international law sphere (from a considerable body on Islam and international law, see for 
instance Baderin, 2005; Abiad and Mansoor, 2011), and of course analysis of the 
compatibility with law in a national sphere with the international obligations of that country 
(e.g. Hallinan, 2012).  
Understood as “the theoretical part of law as a discipline” (Twining, 1986), legal theory may, 
in contrast, draw upon the other spheres only for illustrative examples of the point being 
made, or not at all. In relation to comparative study of national spheres, for instance, Fletcher 
put forward one agenda for a comparative contribution to jurisprudence: “to move the 
discourse to a higher plane of trans-cultural unity. The search for structural features of the 
law, the elaboration of distinctions common to all legal cultures, the clarification of the basic 
units of legal analysis - all of these are intellectual pursuits that unite scholars from diverse 
traditions in a common pursuit” (Fletcher, 1998 at 693-4). A good sense of the range of 
writing on legal theory in relation to law and religion can be gauged from two recent 
collections. The first, edited by Cane, Evans and Robinson, includes contributions on equality 
and tolerance and public reason (Cane et al, 2011).The second, edited by Zucca and 
Ungureanu, includes contributions on the idea of toleration, the public sphere, and religious 
pluralism  (Zucca and Ungureanu, 2011). 
Orientation. 
Another feature to consider is the principal orientation of the scholarly piece. 
A not uncommon orientation is that of legal source. It is not unusual to find scholarly work 
which orientates itself primarily around for instance a key provision in national legislation, an 
international legal instrument, or a decision of a national court (particularly in those 
jurisdictions which place considerable weight on such decisions, for instance the US or 
Canada). This is an area where a scholar who does not primarily identify as a law and religion 
specialist is perhaps particularly likely to make a powerful contribution to the field. Scholars 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, for instance, may bring this specialism to bear 
on the principal religious rights clause of the ECHR, Article 9 (e.g. White and Ovey, 2010); a 
scholar of the US Constitution onto an aspect of the religious test clause of the US 
Constitution, Article VI (e.g. Dunn, 2013); or a specialist in charity law onto religious 
charities (Luxton and Evans, 2011). The strength of this orientation is that it is likely to 
provide a powerful account of a particular source; a limitation is that it may not draw explicit 
connections with sources and arguments which are factually or theoretically significant to the 
reader. 
A similarly successful orientation is that of an area of law – an established field of study 
which is neither exclusively concerned with law and religion, nor a single set of legal 
sources. A good example here is the area of employment law. Vickers has a substantial body 
of work focussed around the protection of human rights in the workplace, which includes not 
only exploration of issues around equality and diversity (e.g. Vickers, 2011), but also the 
exercise of freedom of speech in employment (Vickers, 2002), and freedom of religion in that 
context (e.g. Vickers, 2008). The strength of this orientation is the embeddedness within the 
context in which the interaction of law/religion operates, which can avoid inaccurate 
exceptionalism being ascribed to that interaction; the limitation that this very embeddedness 
can set the parameters for discussion.  
An alternative orientation is around that of a topic, or particular difficulty. Here the scholarly 
focus is on a particular issue, which may implicate a very wide range of different areas of law 
and legal sources. This sort of work differs from the orientation around a field in that existing 
legal divisions, or sub-fields, are not the basis for the selection of the topic. To use an 
example from my own work, my study of sacred places in English law did not draw upon 
existing disciplinary understandings of “place law”, nor did it draw upon an existing 
consensus of the sorts of legal doctrines and sources that were implicated in understanding 
sacred places. Instead it sought to construct a category for study around a broad 
understanding of the sacred and of place derived from other disciplines, and then sought to 
identify legal doctrines and sources which were relevant to this category (Edge, 2002). The 
strength of this approach is that it facilitates investigation across a wide range of legal 
doctrines and concerns, which may open up interesting avenues for enquiry; the limitation 
that the scholar risks being a visitor to a number of areas, rather than a resident in any – in the 
words of Solum, a wanderer (Solum, 2007). 
A related, but distinct, orientation is around that of a particular religious community. This 
orientation is more demanding than might be anticipated by scholars outside the discipline of 
law. Take for instance an orientation around the Islamic community in the UK national 
sphere. Inevitably, such an orientation requires considerable discernment, particularly as 
much of UK law concerning religion is of general application, rather than there existing a 
large corpus of law relating to Muslims.  Ideally, this sort of work is attentive to the legal 
issues of particular significance to that community, as we see in Fournier’s study of mahr for 
instance (Fournier, 2013), although how that judgment is to be made itself is appropriately 
contentious. Alternatively, it may be driven mainly by legal disputes and the involvement of 
legal actors – producing an image of law and religion which overemphasises conflict and 
dispute resolution, and risks representing, or shaping, law as “a discipline of crisis” 
(Charlesworth, 2002). In either case, because the orientation is around a community, rather 
than a sub-field within law, the expertise required may naturally lead to collaborative work or 
collections of essays (such as Griffith-Jones, 2013). 
A final orientation is around a principle, or theoretical doctrine. In his consideration of 
Dworkin’s theoretical underpinnings for religious freedom, for instance, Domingo concludes 
that the basis for religious freedom should be ethical autonomy, rather than ethical 
independence (Domingo, 2013). Similarly, Chaplin’s consideration of state neutrality is 
orientated around a consideration of the nature of public reason (Chaplin, 2012). 
 
Concerns. 
Scholars whose contribution to law and religion is primarily en passant in relation to a 
different research project are likely to be informed by the concerns of that other research 
project. So a scholar whose fundamental interest is employment law may contribute to our 
understanding of religious discrimination, but their fundamental concerns are likely to be 
drawn from that field (e.g. Pitt, 2011). A scholar whose abiding concerns are taxation, will 
similarly draw concerns from that field into a discussion of taxation of a particular Church 
(Mastellone, 2013). In relation to contributions which are squarely within law and religion, 
are there abiding concerns which may be identified? 
In such a rapidly emerging and diverse field, such a summary should be approached with 
trepidation by the author, and caution by the reader. That said, it feels to me that there are 
four significant, but of course overlapping and interwoven concerns, which are frequently 
found in contemporary work in the field. 
Firstly, religious rights. In particular, I mean their justification, distinctiveness, appropriate 
reach and application, legitimate restriction, and enforcement. Partaking of two much broader 
bodies of work – constitutional rights law and international human rights law – this area of 
work has a long history, and indeed can easily be seen as implicated in the origin of both sets 
of positive law. Important examples within particular spheres include Evans’ work on 
international law (Evans, 2008), and McCrea’s on the European Union (McCrea, 2010), but it 
should be noted that this is an area particularly rich for comparative work (see for instance 
Lock, 2013).  
Secondly, equality and religion. I choose this term, rather than religious equality, with care. 
There is an established body of work on discrimination on the grounds of religion, 
particularly to be found in relation to spheres and topics where there are legal non-
discrimination regimes (e.g. Christoffersen and Vinding, 2013), but also in relation to issues 
such as equality and the sentencing of a religious defendant (Bakalis, 2013), and broader 
constitutional issues (for a wide-ranging survey, see Hill, 2012). Additionally, there is a 
growing body of work which considers religion from the other direction. By this I mean not 
as a ground upon which an individual may be discriminated against, but as a ground which 
may motivate, or be used to justify, discrimination on either religious or other grounds (e.g. 
McCrudden, 2011; Malik, 2011; Hertogh, 2009). Contemporary work has, for instance, 
particularly focussed on tensions between sexual orientation equality and discrimination (e.g. 
Sandberg, 2011). 
Thirdly, autonomy and religion. Again, I choose this term rather than religious autonomy. An 
abiding concern of legal scholars has been the autonomy, or otherwise, of religious 
organisations and communities against the state. Conversely, another set of concerns are 
raised concerning the autonomy of the state against religious organisations (see for instance 
Temperman, 2010). Bodies of US and French scholarship, in particular, have engaged with 
the latter (e.g. Barras, 2013; for an important contrast between the two, see Baehr and 
Gordon, 2013), but it is by no means a concern alien to scholars working in spheres with an 
intimate relationship between the state and a historically dominant religious organisation (see 
e.g. Cumper and Lewis, 2012). The issue of the place of religion, and religious arguments, in 
the public sphere is a good example of contemporary concerns (see for instance Zimmermann 
and Weinberger, 2012). 
Fourthly, the interaction of different bodies of law, and the influence they have upon one 
another. I have already suggested that comparative study of law in different spheres of 
operation is an area of growing importance within law and religion. It may perhaps even be 
said that we are all comparativists now, so the point bears repetition. This study of law in 
different spheres can, however, go beyond comparison and instead seek to focus on 
interaction (e.g. Kennedy, 2012). A good example is international human rights, and its 
relationship, both historical and contemporary, with different religious laws (see Witte and 
Green, 2011). Another is scholarship on the interaction of, in particular, Islamic law and 
national and international laws. The latter has been given particular focus by the post-9/11 
security agenda of many states, which sees some forms of Islam as contrary to their national 
interest, although the significance of an ‘anti-extremism agenda’ to the consideration of law 
and religion can go further (e.g. Cliteur, 2012).    
 
Concluding thoughts: Seven things to expect when talking to legal scholars about law 
and religion. 
Much legal scholarship is not intended for a multidisciplinary audience. There are bodies of 
work quite clearly aimed at providing resources for legal professionals (e.g. Knights, 2007; 
Ventura, 2013), but even outside this, legal scholars within the Langdellian tradition in 
particular, write and have written, “to reform and to improve the law. [t]hrough our 
scholarship we directly participated in the legal system, in legal and judicial practices, by 
advising lawyers and judges, or at least so we imagined” (Feldman, 2004 at 472-3). One 
substantial imagined audience for legal scholars, then, has been the legal profession. This still 
remains an important target for legal writing, particularly for those with an agenda informed 
by ideas of action research, knowledge exchange, co-production of research, or impact. There 
is also a body of work aimed not at legal professionals, but at students undertaking legal 
study as part of preparation for the legal professions (e.g. McConnell et al, 2011). Given the 
role, across a wide range of different countries, of law schools in teaching students law as 
part of professional and vocational training, this is unlikely to disappear (Feldman, 2004). As 
well as their professional and law student audiences, legal scholars write, not always 
compatibly with these audiences, for other legal scholars. 
  
Turning to interdisciplinary conversation, specific topics within law and religion will be of 
immediate significance to students of other disciplines, and these topics may be addressed by 
texts aimed at them, typically as an additional audience to law students. We see this in 
Howard’s discussion of banning of religious symbols in education, which aims to address an 
audience including students in education (Howard, 2013). Legal scholars may also seek to 
write for an interdisciplinary audience of other scholars.  
 
On occasion, this may have been a relatively minor theme in legal scholarship, and not 
always because of the limits of legal scholars. Posner attributed the survival of law as a 
distinct discipline in the US towards the end of the nineteenth century in part to the fact that 
“the economist and the statistician - not to mention the philosopher, the sociologist, the 
political scientist, the historian, the psychologist, the linguist, and the anthropologist (notably 
excepting Henry Maine) - were not much interested in law” (Posner, 1987 at 762). 
Nonetheless, legal scholars have sought to engage in interdisciplinary work, not simply as the 
“colonised” of interdisciplinarity (Balkin, 1996), but as scholars emerging from an 
intellectual community with something to add as a “conversation partner” (Witte, 2012 at 
329). Within law and religion, this type of interdisciplinary conversation can take the form of 
an internal dialogue (e.g. Jivraj, 2013), but can also draw in scholars from a range of 
disciplines – as we see for instance in the recent comparative study of reactions to the burqa 
across Europe (Ferrari and Pastorelli, 2013). What contribution to such a conversation might 
a lawyer be expected to make? 
 
Firstly, a partner might expect the lawyer’s contribution to be primarily technical. One mode 
in which legal scholars, particularly of a Langdellian turn, can be seen as useful by other 
disciplines is providing accurate, appropriately detailed, and well-supported statements of the 
law relevant to a particular area of study. This view reduces legal scholarship to “little 
different from a glorified appellate brief: it specified an issue, identified and parsed the 
relevant cases, and recommended a solution” (Feldman, 2004 at 483). The partner should 
expect that the legal scholar will not only have information to bring to the conversation, but 
particular concerns “proper to the law” (Jenkins, 1966 at 176). An interdisciplinary 
conversation should not assume that the lawyer constitutes a form of in-house counsel for the 
other scholars, any more than it assumes that non-lawyers provide expert information on the 
context for a legal discussion.. 
  
Secondly, the partner should expect the contribution of a lawyer to be constrained by the 
lawyer’s internal demarcations of expertise. This is particularly significant in relation to the 
spheres of operation discussed above. Bearing in mind that Langdellian discussion in 
particular can use tremendously different methodologies in different spheres – each of which 
is apposite for that sphere but may be positively misleading in another – this goes beyond 
simple knowledge to methodology, and the underlying assumptions of lawyers in that sphere. 
So the partner should not only recognise that (say) an Irish lawyer may not be au fait with 
Swedish law, but also that an Irish lawyer and a Swedish lawyer may make very different 
conversationalists, because of this intellectual context. 
 
Thirdly, the partner can anticipate a potential groundedness in legal scholarship, particularly 
that focussed on understanding and informing formal legal moments, such as the giving of a 
judgment in a case. Feldman would not necessarily agree, believing that “Judges must, for the 
most part, resolve disputes, no matter how complex the case, so that one litigant wins and the 
other loses, but scholars need not reach such reductive solutions”. (Feldman, 2004 at 492). 
Recognising the increasing diversity of approach within law, however, it is probably still 
common for lawyers to have a concern with the ramifications of their studies, and with 
operationalization (Lopez and Lunau, 2012). As Balkin and Levinson put it, “the demand that 
legal scholarship be cashed out in policy prescriptions deeply circumscribes the legal 
imagination” (Balkin and Levinson, 2006 at 175).  
 
Fourthly, the partner should be prepared for a distinct approach to data, and in particular to 
arguments from authority. The tremendous variety of contemporary legal scholarship, much 
of which is informed by and partakes of the values of other disciplines, means that this 
generalisation is no longer as true as it once was (see more generally Bix, 2009). However, 
Samuel has argued cogently that “both law and theology are founded, as disciplines, on the 
authority of given texts” (Samuel, 2009 at 441; for a fuller exploration of this comparison, 
see Kwak, 2009) and that shifts in the foundation of discipline have been shifts on the basis 
of the source of the authority, not a rejection of authority itself. Samuel concludes: “The 
problem with the legal scholarly work being pursued within the authority paradigm is that it 
is not really telling us much about the world. It is, like astrology or numerology, telling us 
about formalism, coherence, and philosophy in a world constructed by consenting insiders” 
(Samuel, 2009 at 459; see also Samuel, 2008). 
 
Fifthly, and a related point, the partner may find the emphasis on the particular, at times 
seeming to amount to pedantry, a source of tension in conversation. Langdellian legal 
education can give tremendous emphasis to the particular and the specific. Bradney argues 
that this sort of emphasis on doctrine emphasises close reasoning and the utmost attention to 
textual context, but at the expense of “the making of the connections with the wider questions 
which lie at the root of human enquiry” (Bradney, 1998 at 76). He goes further, arguing that 
“[d]octrinal concepts, like the techniques of doctrinal argument, by their form, forbid all 
serious political, ethical or personal thought and not just some kinds of such thought” 
(Bradney, 1988 at 78). To quote a non-legal source, there is a danger that “[t]he lawyer’s 
world is entire to itself, the human pared away” (Mantel, 2012 at 369). 
 
Sixthly, the partner should be aware of the emphasis that lawyers give to “the argument”. 
One possible weakness of legal scholarship on law and religion is the background in 
advocacy that many academic lawyers have. Legal scholars are not so patently advocates as 
legal practitioners of course (van Zandt, 2003). It is not unusual, however, for active 
advocates, representing clients in court, to also be active contributors through scholarly work. 
Perhaps as commonly, legal scholars will have moved into the academy from a professional, 
client-orientated, background with an emphasis on advocacy. Even those scholars who have 
never been involved in legal practice will frequently have an academic education which they 
shared with those being prepared for advocacy, and a working life which involves preparing 
others in this way. The link between legal scholars and legal professions is a strong one, and 
brings with it what may be described as the problem of advocacy (Tushnet, 1981). As 
Cramton puts it: “[m]uch legal scholarship pretends to an objectivity it does not deliver; it 
fails to state or to examine the premises on which it is based; and it conveys a hubris of truth 
and righteousness (and sometimes even moral indignation directed at those holding opposing 
views) that is inconsistent with the humility of the true scholar” (Cramton, 1987 at 7-8).  
 
Finally, a partner might approach the conversation envisaging “law as a dry, technical, 
‘applied’ subject” (Twining, 2009 at xii). This would be a profound error.  Bradney is 
sceptical of the sort of Langdellian work which I have focussed on in this chapter, and his 
words need to be understood in a context which identifies law much more closely with socio-
legal studies than I do. Nonetheless, he makes a valuable point when he argues that: “Law, 
far from being an abstruse, technical discipline marginal to the university, is intricately 
involved in all that study in the university which involves either humanity, society or the 
state” (Bradney, 1998 at 83). Partners should anticipate being stimulated, informed, 
entertained, and occasionally enraged, but not bored. 
References. 
Abiad N and Mansoor F, (2011), Criminal law and the rights of the Child in Muslim States: 
A comparative and analytical perspective, London: British Institution of Interrnational and 
Comparative Law. 
Ahdar R and Leigh I, (2013), Religious freedom in the Liberal State, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Baderin MA, (2005), International Human Rights Law and Islamic Law, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Baehr P and Gordon D, (2013), “From the headscarf to the burqa: The role of social theorists 
in shaping laws against the veil”, Economy and Society 42(2), 249. 
Bakalis C, (2013), “The religion of the offender and the concept of equality in the sentencing 
process”, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2(2), 440. 
Balkin JM and Levinson S, (2006), “Law and the humanities: An uneasy relationship”, Yale 
Journal of Law and Humanities 18, 155. 
Balkin JM, (1996), “Interdisciplinarity as colonization”, Washington and Lee Law Review 
53, 949. 
Banaker R and Travers M, (2005), Theory and method in socio-legal research, Oxford: Hart. 
Barras A, (2013), “Sacred laïcité and the politics of religious resurgence in France: Whither 
religious pluralism?”, Mediterranean Politics 18(2), 276. 
Bix BH, (2003), “Law as an autonomous discipline” in The Oxford Handbook of Legal 
Studies. 
Bix BH, 2009, “Global error and legal truth”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29(3), 535. 
Bradney A and Cownie M, (2000), Living without law: An enthnography of Quaker decision-
making, dispute avoidance and dispute resolution, London: Ashgate Publishing. 
Bradney A., (1998), “Law as a parasitic discipline”, Journal of Law and Society 25(1), 71. 
Cane P et al (eds), (2011), Law and religion in theoretical and historical context, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP. 
Chaplin J, (2012), “Law, religion and public reasoning”, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
1(2), 319. 
Charlesworth H, (2002), “International law: A discipline of crisis”, Modern Law Review 
65(3), 377.  
Christoffersen L and Vinding NV, (2013), “Challenged pragmatism: Conflicts of religion and 
law in the Danish labour market”, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 13(2-
3), 140. 
Cliteur P, (2012), “State and religion against the backdrop of religious radicalism”, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 10(1), 127. 
Cramton RC, (1987), “Demystifying legal scholarship”, Georgetown Law Journal 75, 1. 
Cumper P and Lewis T (eds.), (2012), Religion, Rights and Secular Society: European 
Perspectives, London: Edward Elgar. 
Daly E, (2012), Religion, Law and the Irish State, Dublic: Clarus Press. 
Doe N, (2011), Law and religion in Europe: A comparative introduction, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Doe N, (2013), “The teaching of Church law: An Ecumenical Exploration Worldwide”, 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 15,267. 
Domingo R, (2013), “Religion for hedgehogs? An argument against the Dworkinian 
approach to religious freedom”, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2(2), 371. 
Dunn CW (ed), (2013), American Exceptionalism, New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Edge PW, (2002), “The construction of sacred places in English law”, Journal of 
Environmental Law 14(2), 161. 
Evans M, (2008), Religious liberty and international law in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP. 
Feldman S.M., (2004), “The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law Professors in 
the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too)”, 54(4) Journal of Legal Education 471.  
Ferrari A and Pastorelli S, (2013), The Burqa affair across Europe, London: Ashgate. 
Fitzpatrick P and Hunt A, (1987), “Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction” Journal of Law 
and Society 14(1), 1. 
Fletcher G.P., (1998), “Comparative law as a subversive discipline”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law 46(4), 683.  
Fournier P, (2013), Muslim marriage in Western Courts, London: Ashgate. 
Griffith-Jones R (ed.), (2013), Islam and English Law: Rights, responsibilities and the place 
of Shari’a, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Hafner A, Kroissenbrunner S and Potz R (eds), (2010), State, Law and Religion in Pluralistic 
Societies: Austrian and Indonesian Perspectives, Vienna: Vienna UP. 
Hallinan D, (2012), “Orthodox Pluralism: Contours of freedom of religion in the Russian 
Federation and Strasbourg jurisprudence”, Review of Central and East European Law 
37(2/3), 293. 
Hertogh M, (2009), “What’s in a handshake? Legal equality and legal consciousness in the 
Netherlands”, Social & Legal Studies 18(2), 221. 
Hill M (ed), (2012), Religion and discrimination law in the European Union, Trier: European 
Consortium for Church and State Research.1 
Howard E, (2013), Law and the wearing of religious symbols: European bans on the wearing 
of religious symbols in education, London: Routledge. 
Jenkins I, (1966), “Legal institutions, the legal profession, and the discipline of law”, Journal 
of Legal Education 19, 171. 
Jivraj S, (2013), “Interrogating religion: Christian/Secular values, citizenship and racial 
upliftment in governmental education policy”, International Journal of the Law in Context 
318. 
Kandel RF, (1993), “Whither the legal whale: Interdisciplinarity and the socialization of 
professional identity”, Loyola LA Law Review 9. 
Kennedy C, (2012), “Criminal law and religion in post-reformation Scotland”, Edinburgh 
Law Review 178. 
Knights S, (2007), Freedom of religion, minorities and the law, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Kwak A-J (ed.), (2009), Holy Writ: Interpretation in Law and Religion, London: Ashgate. 
Lock T, (2013), “Religious freedom and belief discrimination in Germany and the United 
Kingdom: Towards a common European standard?” European Law Review 655. 
Lopez JJ and Lunau J, (2012), “ELSIfication in Canada: Legal modes of reasoning”, Science 
As Culture 21(1), 77. 
Luxton P and Evans N, (2011), “Cogent and cohesive: Two recent Charity Commission 
decisions on the advancement of religion” Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 144. 
Malik M, (2011), “Religious freedom, free speech and equality: Conflict or cohesion?”, Res 
Publica 17(1), 21. 
Mantel H, (2012), Bring up the bodies, London: Fourth Estate. 
Mastellone P, (2013), “Religion and taxation in Italy: The principle of laïcité and compliance 
with EU law”, European Taxation 53(8), 378. 
McConnell MW et al, (2011), Religion and the constitution, Amsterdam: Wolters Kluwer. 
McCrea R, (2010), Religion and the Public Order of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
UP. 
McCrudden C, (2011), “Religion, Human Rights, Equality and the Public Sphere”,  
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 26. 
Ombres R, (2012), “Canon law and theology” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14, 164. 
PennLaw, (2013) “New World(s) of Faith: Religion and Law in Historical Perspective, 1500-
2000”, https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/legalhistory/conferences/new-worlds/ accessed 
2 December 2013. 
Pitt G, (2011), Keeping the faith: Trends and tensions in religion or belief discrimination, 
Industrial Law Journal 384. 
Posner R.A., (1987), “The decline of Law as an autonomous discipline, 1962-1987”, 100 
Harvard Law Review 761. 
Posner RA, (1988), “Conventionalism: The key to law as an autonomous discipline?”, 
University of Toronto Law Journal 30(4), 333. 
Rivers J, (2010), The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism, 
Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Robbers G, (2013), Religion and Law in Germany, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International. 
Samuel G, (2008), “Is law really a social science? A view from comparative law”, Cambridge 
Law Journal 67, 288. 
Samuel G, (2009), “Interdisciplinarity and the authority paradigm: Should law be taken 
seriously by social scientists”, Journal of Law and Society 36(4), 431. 
Sandberg R and Doe N, (2007), “Religious exemptions in discrimination law”, Cambridge 
Law Journal 302. 
Sandberg R, (2011), Law and religion, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Sandberg R, (2011a), “The right to discriminate”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157. 
Schlag P., (1997) “Law and phrenology”, Harvard Law Review 110(4), 877.  
Solum LB, (2007), “Foxes, hedgehogs and the legal academy”, Legal Theory Blog Jul 20 
2007, cited in Davidson S, (2010), “Way beyond legal research: Understanding the research 
habits of legal scholars”, Law Library Journal 102(4), 561. 
Taylor PM, (2005), Freedom of religion:  UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Temperman J, (2010), State-religion relationships and Human Rights Law: Towards a right to 
religiously neutral governance, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Tomlins C and Comaroff J, (2011), “’Law as’: Theory and practice of legal history”, UC 
Irvine Law Review 1(3), 1040. 
Tushnet M, (1981), “Legal scholarship: Its causes and cure”, Yale Law Journal 90, 1205.  
Twining W, (1986) “Evidence and legal theory” in Twining W (ed), Legal theory and 
common law, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Twining W, (2009), General jurisprudence, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Van Zandt, DE, (2003), “Discipline-based Faculty”, Journal of Legal Education 53, 332. 
Ventura M, (2013), Religion and Law in Italy, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International. 
Vick DW, (2004), “Interdisciplinarity and the discipline of law”, Journal of Law and Society 
31(2), 163. 
Vickers L, (2002), Freedom of speech and employment, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Vickers L, (2008), Religious freedom, religious discrimination and the workplace, Oxford: 
Hart.  
Vickers L, (2011), “Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality 
duty and religion and belief”, Legal Studies 135. 
Von Benda-Backmann F, (2008), “Riding or killing the centaur? Reflections on the identity 
of legal anthropology”, International Journal of Law in Context 85. 
Ward I, (2004), Introduction to Critical Legal Theory, London: Cavendish. 
Welchman L, (2007), Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A comparative 
overview of textual development and advocacy, Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP. 
White RCA and Ovey C, (2010), Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Witte J and Green MC (eds.), (2011), Religion and human rights: An introduction, Oxford: 
Oxford UP. 
Witte J, (2002), Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Witte J, (2008), The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in Early 
Modern Calvinism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Witte J, (2012), “The study of law and religion in the United States: An interim report”, 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 327. 
Zimmermann A and Weinberger LA, (2012), “Secularization by law? The establishment 
clauses and religion in the public square in Australia and the United States”, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 10(1), 208. 
Zucca L and Ungureanu C (eds), (2011) Law, state and religion in the New Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Zucca L, (2012), A secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional 
Landscape, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
